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TORTS-Products Liability-Subsequent Remedial Meas-
ures Admissible Under Allegations of Negligence and Strict
Liability. D.L v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890
(1983).
The admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in
strict liability tort actions has become an intriguing subject
for many legal theorists and commentators. However, the
topic is of far greater significance to judges who must decide
whether the evidence pertaining to subsequent remedial
measures should be admitted. Since the 1977 ruling in Chart
v. General Motors Corp. ,1 Wisconsin courts have admitted
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liabil-
ity actions alleging strict liability. In Chart the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of evi-
dence related to changes made by General Motors in its sus-
pension system design of the 1964 and 1965 Corvair.2 Other
jurisdictions have taken positions both consistent with and
contrary to that taken in Chart.
1. 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
2. The court stated that the applicable statute was Wis. STAT. § 904.07 (1981-82),
which provides as follows:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of subse-
quent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeach-
ment or proving a violation of s. 101.11.
Chart, 80 Wis. 2d at 100, 258 N.W.2d at 684.
The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence are promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin pursuant to authority given in WIs. STAT. § 751.12 (1981-82). In promul-
gating the Rules, the court expressly reserves the power to "repeal, amend, modify, or
otherwise amplify specific rules of evidence by individual decisions of this court with-
out following general rule-making procedures of this court." 59 Wis. 2d R2 (1973).
3. The seminal case construing the exclusionary rule as inapplicable in strict
products liability actions is Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528
P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974). Several jurisdictions follow the Aul/ reasoning,
or admit such evidence on other grounds. See, e.g., Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 Ill.
App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354 (1978); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill.
App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 395 Mich. 661, 238
N.W.2d 1 (1979). But see Ferdig v. Melitta, Inc., 115 Mich. App. 340, 320 N.W.2d
369 (1982); Phillips v. J.L. Hudson Co., 79 Mich. App. 425, 263 N.W.2d 3 (1978);
Lavin v. Fauci, 107 N.J. Super. 403, 406 A.2d 978 (1979); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp.,
52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545 (1981); LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio
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Recently, in D.L. v. Huebner,4 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court expanded the principles in Chart relating to the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule5 in products liability actions
which governs the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures. 6 Huebner addressed for the first time the applica-
bility of the exclusionary rule in products liability actions
that allege both negligence and strict liability. The court
held that evidence of remedial measures was admissible to
prove Huebner's liability.7
This note will analyze the Huebner decision and its rea-
soning. Part I will explore the theoretical foundation for the
exclusionary rule and discuss its role in a products liability
context. Part II will present the Huebner facts, the court's
decision and its rationale. Part III will analyze the signifi-
cance of Huebner to future products liability litigants.
App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533 (1976); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251 (S.D.
1976); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982). Nine circuits have
addressed the issue. With the exception of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the majority of circuits conclude that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is inadmissible in a products liability action based upon strict liability in tort. See
infra notes 67 & 68.
4. 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).
5. The exclusionary rule is the common name given to FED. R. EvID. 407 which
provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, con-
trol, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
6. For a complete discussion of the state rules which have codified the exclusion-
ary rule, see generally DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCT LIABILITY TRIAL
NOTEBOOK 22-29 (1983).
7. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 594, 329 N.W.2d at 898. In Chart, General Motors
argued that the plaintiff had tried the action, at least as it related to General Motors,
on the theories of negligence and strict liability. Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Chart
v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977). The court deter-
mined the case had been tried on solely a strict liability theory, which it referred to as
a defective design. Chart, 80 Wis. 2d at 98-99, 258 N.W.2d at 682-683. Therefore, the
issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied in actions involving both negligence
and strict liability theories was unresolved until Huebner.
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I. HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Theoretical Justftcation
The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence of a man-
ufacturer's subsequent remedial action. Three arguments
are generally asserted in support of the rule: (1) the evidence
is irrelevant on the issue of prior negligence; (2) admissibility
of evidence concerning subsequent remedial measures
would discourage individuals from taking remedial meas-
ures; and (3) those who take post-accident safety measures
act as responsible citizens should act.
The first argument has received wide acceptance.
"[C]ourts [have] reasoned that taking precautions against fu-
ture harm could not be construed as an admission of respon-
sibility for the past and did not prove the defendant's
conduct was culpable."'8 Furthermore, the argument contin-
ues, the evidence is not sufficiently probative to outweigh the
danger of confusing, misleading or unduly prejudicing the
jury.9 Therefore, even if the evidence was deemed relevant
to the issue of negligence, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 10 which balances probative value against risks of
prejudice or confusion, would probably lead to its
inadmissibility.
As early as 1892, the United States Supreme Court dis-
cussed relevancy as a ground for excluding evidence."
However, "[t]his relevancy ground. . . is generally consid-
ered to be the weaker of the. . . rationales and most com-
8. Note, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 371,
374 (1979).
9. Note, Chart v. General Motors Corp.: Did It Chart the Wayfor Admission of
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Products Liability Actions?, 41 OHIo ST.
L.J. 211, 214 (1980).
10. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
11. The United States Supreme Court recognized that:
[T]he evidence is incompetent, because the taking of such precautions against
the future is not to be construed as an admission of responsibility for the past,
has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant had been negligent
before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the minds of the
jury from the real issue, and to create prejudice against the defendant.
Columbia & P.S.R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
[Vol. 67:188
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mentators recognize that it would not be strong enough on
its own to support the exclusionary rule."12 Moreover, under
the modem and broad definition of relevancy, evidence is
considered relevant if it has "any tendency" to make the
existence of a material fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.1 3 Therefore, evidence of a
subsequent remedial measure may be relevant "because an
admission of negligence is apossible inference from the evi-
dence."'14 In addition, it is argued that evidence of a subse-
quent remedial measure "may be relevant as a circumstance
tending to show consciousness that the situation called for
additional safety precautions."'' 5
The second argument advanced in support of the exclu-
sionary rule is based upon public policy favoring voluntary
corrective action by manufacturers. Those who support the
public policy argument reason that admission of evidence
concerning remedial measures would discourage individuals
or corporations from taking remedial measures. Thus, "[i]t
is thought that precluding evidence of repairs at trial will
encourage a person to make repairs. . after an accident." 6
However, various commentators have criticized the pub-
lic policy argument on a number of grounds. First, they sug-
gest that "most potential defendants, particularly
manufacturers, have a sufficient self-interest that they would
take corrective measures to avoid unfavorable publicity and
consumer backlash regardless of the admissibility of evi-
dence to those measures."' 7 But this viewpoint is rebutted
by the fact that some manufacturers may determine that the
unfavorable public exposure is economically outweighed by
the expenses associated with altering a product the manufac-
turer considers safe. Furthermore, critics of the public pol-
icy argument note that most potential defendants do not
12. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 605, 329 N.W.2d 890, 901 (1983).
13. FED. R. EvID. 401.
14. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581,606, 329 N.W.2d 890, 901 (1983) (emphasis
in original).
15. Note, supra note 8, at 374.
16. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 606, 329 N.W.2d 890, 901 (1983). See also
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 275 (2d ed. 1972) ("The pre-
dominant reason for excluding such evidence, however, is not lack of probative signif-
icance but a policy against discouraging the taking of safety measures.").
17. Note, supra note 9, at 216.
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even know of the existence of the exclusionary rule, and if
they are aware of the rule, they are probably also aware of
the various exceptions to the rule.' 8 Critics have also em-
phasized that "insurers who recognize [the] economic reality
are likely to encourage or require remedial measures regard-
less of the evidentiary rules."' 9
This last criticism deserves comment. It ignores the fact
that manufacturers may be less concerned with the public
policy considerations given their growing movement toward
either retaining large funds for future legal expenses or se-
lecting self-insured status. Thus, after performing a cost-
benefit analysis, many manufacturers might be more willing
to forego remedial changes and continue to sell a product
which may be unsafe to consumers.
The third rationale underlying the exclusionary rule is a
relatively recent emphasis on fundamental notions of fair
play. Fair play suggests that "people who take post-accident
safety measures are doing exactly what good citizens should
do. In these circumstances, so long as the relevancy of the
activity is not great, courts do not wish to sanction proce-
dures that appear to punish praiseworthy behavior."2° The
fairness argument has drawn little attention from critics of
the exclusionary rule. One reason why it is not widely es-
poused may be the public's lack of sympathy for large corpo-
rations. The public generally is not offended when large
corporations are held to a "looser" standard of fairness if the
standard results in the corporation assuming the financial
burden for injuries caused by its products.21
B. Exceptions
Although broad in scope, the exclusionary rule has sev-
18. Id. See also 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 164
(1978); Note, supra note 8, at 376.
19. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 607, 329 N.W.2d 890, 902 (1983). See also
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 407(02), at 407-10 (1982);
Note, supra note 9, at 216.
20. See Note, supra note 9, at 216 (citing S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 164 (2d ed. 1977)). See also 2 D. LoUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 18, § 163.
21. Note, supra note 9, at 216.
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eral exceptions.2 The list of exceptions includes "proving
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures,
if controverted, or impeachment. 23 This list is illustrative,
not exhaustive.2 4 Thus, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures will be deemed admissible when offered for a pur-
pose other than to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
However, if the evidence is admitted for another purpose,
the defendant is entitled to a limiting jury instruction to the
effect that the evidence may only be considered for the pur-
pose for which it was admitted.
The number of exceptions to the exclusionary rule has
limited the benefit defendants usually derive from it.26 But
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence still gives courts
broad discretion to exclude even relevant evidence.2 7 The
court may exclude evidence that is prejudicial, misleading to
the jury or confusing to the issues. Thus, a determination
that certain evidence falls within an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule does not ensure that the evidence will be
admitted.
C The Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Products Liability
In the past the exclusionary rule was steadfastly applied
by courts faced with products liability actions based upon
negligence. However, it was not as clear whether the rule
applied to products liability actions based upon strict liabil-
ity in tort.
In products liability negligence actions, the focus is the
conduct of the defendant. The factfinder must determine the
22. Note, Evidence of Subsequent Changes in Design ls Admissible in a Strict Lia-
bility Suit - Ault v. International Harvester, Inc., 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 637, 639 (1975).
23. FED. R. EVID. 407. For text of FED. R. EvID. 407, see supra note 5.
24. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 600, 329 N.W.2d 890, 898 (1983).
25. IA L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.04(1) (1983). See
also McCoRMimC, supra note 16, § 275.
26. Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J.
837, 845. The author states:
Instead of excluding most evidence of subsequent repairs, courts appear will-
ing, if not eager, to admit such evidence. With the rule so restricted in its
application and subject to many exceptions, it will be a rare plaintiff who can-
not find a justification for introducing evidence of subsequent repairs, particu-
larly when several defendants have been joined in the action.
Id.
27. For text of FED. R. EVID. 403, see supra note 10.
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foreseeability of the harm and the actions a reasonable per-
son would have taken under similar circumstances. How-
ever, in a products liability action based upon strict liability,
the focus is on the product's defective condition and the de-
fendant's control over the product. Thus, it can be argued
that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is highly rel-
evant on the issue of defective condition. Also, since negli-
gence is not at issue, the likelihood that the evidence will be
misdirected to establish the defendant's prior misconduct is
minimized.28 Therefore, it is less likely that the jury will
misconstrue the evidence as an admission of negligence. 29
Some courts suggest that the policy underlying strict lia-
bility in tort is advanced by the admission of evidence con-
cerning subsequent remedial measures. "The purpose of
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturer who
put such products on the market, rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves. ' 30 Thus,
the admission of facts tending to prove a manufacturer's lia-
bility encourages the theory's principal objective of protect-
ing the public from unreasonably dangerous products.31
Commentators also suggest that admission of evidence con-
cerning subsequent remedial measures supports the cost-
spreading rationale underlying strict liability because "the
manufacturer is in the best position to spread the cost of the
accident and absorb the loss. ''32
Those commentators who argue that the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable in products liability actions based upon
strict liability also assert that "[r]elevant evidence should not
be excluded from a products liability case by an obsolete evi-
dentiary rule when modern legal theories, accompanied by
economic and political pressures, will achieve the desired
policy goals. 33 In other words, the exclusionary rule should
28. Note, supra note 26, at 846.
29. DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 40. See also Note, supra
note 26, at 846.
30. Greenmuan v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc. 59 Cal. 2d 57, _ 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
31. Note, supra note 26, at 841.
32. DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 41.
33. Note, supra note 26, at 850.
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only apply in those actions involving allegations of negli-
gence. 4 However, supporters of the exclusionary rule in
products liability actions based upon strict liability stress the
public policy argument, as well as numerous practical diffi-
culties, which would result if the evidence were admitted.
They argue that evidence of subsequent remedial measures
will unduly prejudice and mislead the jury. Fearing that ju-
ries will infer an admission of liability on the part of the
defendant from the subsequent changes, those who favor the
exclusionary rule suggest that juries should not be permitted
to find the defendant liable only on evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. Moreover, when determining liability,
juries should consider other essential elements of the plain-
tiffs case such as proximate cause, legal defectiveness of the
product, and control by the defendant. 6
Another problem perceived by supporters of the exclu-
sionary rule in strict liability actions is the fact that plaintiffs
usually advance multiple theories. A products liability ac-
tion may be based upon several theories of liability. Exam-
ples include strict liability, negligence and breach of
warranty. Supporters of the exclusionary rule argue that, in
multiple theory actions, the admission of evidence of reme-
dial measures under a single theory unduly prejudices and
confuses the jury. Thus, commentators suggest that such ev-
idence be totally excluded from cases in which negligence is
one of the allegations.37
II. THE Huebner Decision
A. The Facts and Holding
In D.L v. Huebner38 the plaintiff, a minor, brought an
action for personal injuries he sustained while working on a
34. DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 41.
35. Note, supra note 26, at 850. The author notes: "Juries should not be permit-
ted to find the defendant liable on such evidence alone in disregard of such other
essential elements of the plaintiff's case as proximate cause, legal defectiveness of the
product, and control by the defendant." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 852.
38. 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).
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farm..39 The plaintiff was injured when he attempted to ex-
tricate a canvas which was caught on the rear of a forage
wagon.40 The complaint against Huebner Implement al-
leged two theories of liability: (1) strict liability in tort for
both selling an unreasonably dangerous machine and failing
to warn of the machine's danger; and, (2) negligence in de-
signing, manufacturing, and selling a machine that failed to
provide a safety feature that would prohibit a user from in-
serting his arm into the area of the sprockets and chains.4'
The trial court, over the defendant's objections, admitted
into evidence safety improvements made by the defendant in
forage wagons manufactured after the wagon used by the
plaintiff was produced. The Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the exclusionary rule was applicable in a
products liability action that alleged both negligence and
strict liability. The court, in a decision authored by Justice
Abrahamson, affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that
based upon the theories of negligence and strict liability, evi-
dence of remedial measures was admissible to prove Hueb-
ner Implement's liability.42
B. The Court's Rationale
Huebner Implement argued that remedial measures are
inadmissible on three grounds.43 First, it argued that the evi-
dence was inadmissible on the negligence theory of liability
because section 904.07 of the Wisconsin Statutes excludes
39. Plaintiff, a thirteen year old boy, and Huebner Implement, argued that once
the jury determined the employer violated the child labor laws, as a matter of law, the
employer was absolutely liable for the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 629, 329 N.W.2d at
912. The supreme court held that this position was consistent with the state's case law
and legislative policy. Id.
40. Id. at 590, 329 N.W.2d at 894.
41. Id. at 591, 329 N.W.2d at 894. The complaint alleged two other negligent
acts by the defendant: (I) negligence in failing to warn or give adequate notice of the
danger, and, (2) negligence in designing the wagon so the board attached to its rear
looked like, but was not, a safety guard. Id.
42. Id. at 614, 329 N.W.2d at 905. Furthermore, the court reversed the judgment
dismissing plaintiffs allegations against his employer and directed that judgment be
entered to reflect the employer's liability under the doctrine of absolute liability. Id.
at 646, 329 N.W.2d at 620.
43. Huebner also argued that the circuit court erred in giving the absent witness
instruction; however, the court concluded the error was harmless. D.L. v. Huebner,
110 Wis. 2d 581, 595, 329 N.W.2d 890, 896 (1983).
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such evidence to prove negligence or culpable conduct, and
the evidence did not fall within any of the exceptions con-
tained in the exclusionary rule. 4 In addition, the defendant
argued that the holding in Chart v. General Motors Corp. ,4
allowing evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict
liability cases, did not apply to actions in which there were
allegations of both negligence and strict liability.46 Finally,
Huebner contended that if Chart applied, it should be lim-
ited to cases involving only "large" manufacturers.47
The court began its discussion by focusing on the defend-
ant's contention that the evidence of remedial action was
wrongfully admitted as to the negligence theory of liability.
The court cited section 904.07 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 48
which is substantially the same as Rule 407 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.49 The court noted that the rule of exclu-
sion is narrow, and the list of exceptions is merely illustra-
tive, not exhaustive. 50 However, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs argument that the evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures was admissible under the impeachment excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule.5 ' But the court did not rest its
decision solely on the impeachment rationale. Because it
feared creating a broad exception, the court stated that
"courts must exercise great care in admitting evidence under
the impeachment exception to prevent the exception from
destroying the rule of exclusion. '"52
On the impeachment issue, the plaintiff argued that since
the defendant's witnesses testified that the wagon was safely
manufactured the plaintiff was entitled to impeach the wit-
nesses by admitting evidence that challenged their credibil-
ity. Plaintiff argued, in effect, that the defendant "opened
the door" to admitting the impeachment evidence by deny-
ing that it was negligent and by introducing evidence of its
44. Id. at 598, 329 N.W.2d at 898.
45. 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
46. Huebner, 110 Wis.2d at 599, 329 N.W.2d at 898.
47. Id.
48. For text of Wis. STAT. § 904.07 (1981-82) see supra note 2.
49. For text of FED. R. EVID. 407 see supra note 5.
50. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 600, 329 N.W.2d at 898.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 600, 329 N.W.2d at 899.
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reasonable care. 3
In its analysis of the admissibility of remedial measures
through impeachment, the court pointed to differing reviews
concerning the scope of the impeachment exception and
concluded that the "inclination to admit post-event remedial
measures" stemmed from the broad scope of the impeach-
ment right, the number of exceptions to the exclusionary rule
and the rule's "weak theoretical underpinnings. ' 54 Although
the court acknowledged the criticisms leveled at the exclu-
sionary rule, it did not propose to eliminate it.55 Instead, the
rule would continue to exist and be subject to the impeach-
ment exception. The court noted that the limiting instruc-
tion was available and its adequacy was a proper factor for
the trial court to consider under section 904.03 when deter-
mining whether the prejudice inherent in the admissibility of
remedial measures through impeachment was outweighed
by its relevance.5 6 Finally, the court cautioned trial courts to
use discretion in excluding evidence admissible under the
impeachment exception when the evidence "proves negli-
gence under the guise of impeachment. 57
Declining the plaintiffs invitation to rest its decision en-
tirely on the impeachment exception, the court examined the
proper scope of its holding in Chart. The court merely took
note of the defendant's arguments in opposition to extending
Chart, and then concluded that "Chart [is extended] to ap-
ply to cases in which negligence, as well as strict liability is
pleaded . *5... 58 The court based its holding on the theory
that to limit Chart to actions in which only strict liability was
pleaded "would seriously undermine the efficacy of products
liability actions in Wisconsin." 59 This is a particular danger
in Wisconsin, since a plaintiff need not elect between
presenting the two theories to the jury and, therefore, plain-
tiffs often base their products liability actions upon both the-
53. Id. at 601, 329 N.W.2d at 899.
54. Id. at 605, 329 N.W.2d at 901.
55. Id. at 607-08, 329 N.W.2d at 902.
56. Id. at 608, 329 N.W.2d at 902.
57. Id. See also 10 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 407.04, at iv-159
(2d ed. 1982).
58. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 609, 329 N.W.2d at 903.
59. Id.
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ories. 60 Moreover, the court stated, "[1]imiting the plaintiffs
proof when both theories are presented would limit the
plaintiff's ability to prove the strict liability allegation, even
though a purpose of adopting the doctrine of strict liability
was to aid the plaintiff in proving his case." 61 Finally, the
court addressed the defendant's contention that the holding
in Chart should be limited to "large" manufacturers. The
court summarily dismissed this issue, declining to base a
holding regarding the admissibility of evidence of post-event
remedial measures on relative differences in corporate size.62
III. ANALYSIS
D.L. v. Huebner63 is significant to future Wisconsin liti-
gants because it may affect the forum in which litigants
choose to bring products liability actions, and because it may
lead to legislative action to clarify the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in strict liability actions.
A. Choice of Forum: Federal or State Court?
The Huebner decision, which extended Chart v. General
Motors Corp. 64 to products liability actions involving both
negligence and strict liability, has little support from either
federal appellate courts65 or the proposed Products Liability
Act of 1983.66 Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
taken what may be a judicially logical step, the court has
now expressly declined to follow the trend established by the
majority of federal circuits.
Federal appellate courts have generally agreed that Rule
407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is applicable to a prod-
ucts liability action predicated upon both negligence and
60. Id. at 609-10, 329 N.W.2d at 903.
61. Id. at 610, 329 N.W.2d at 903.
62. Id. at 612, 329 N.W.2d at 904.
63. 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).
64. 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
65. See infra note 67.
66. The proposed Products Liability Act of 1983 parallels the majority of federal
jurisdictions in providing that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissi-
ble except when "offered to impeach a witness for the manufacturer or product seller
who has expressly denied the feasibility of such a measure." Products Liability Act of
1983, S.44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1983).
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strict liability.67 Among the circuits which have addressed
this issue, the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits are the lone dissenters.6 As one commentator has
noted, "[firom the defendant's viewpoint, this may make
federal court a more attractive forum within which to try a
products liability lawsuit. 69
In contrast to the majority of federal courts, Huebner
provides an opening for Wisconsin plaintiffs to introduce ev-
idence of subsequent remedial measures through the im-
peachment exception to the exclusionary rule.70 The
Huebner court took a broad view of the impeachment excep-
tion. Although Justice Abrahamson acknowledged the exist-
ence of authority to support the view that the evidence was
not admissible under the impeachment exception, she sug-
gested that weighing the rule's numerous exceptions and its
weak theoretical underpinnings against the broad scope of
impeachment under the modem rules, the evidence was ad-
missible. She reasoned that impeachment was applicable
because a representative of Huebner Implement testified that
the product was safe as manufactured.72 Despite the author-
ity cited by the court for its decision, one wonders whether
the reasoning was valid. Why, after a lapse of approxi-
mately twenty years, should a manufacturer be punished for
testifying that its product was safe as manufactured? The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has expressed its view that it will
seek to hold a manufacturer liable, even though it requires a
broad interpretation of the exceptions enumerated in the ex-
clusionary rule.
67. See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883
(5th Cir. 1983); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Oberst v.
International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628
F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Bauman v. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584
F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
68. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1983);
DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1983); Robbins v.
Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
69. DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 36.
70. See Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 607-08, 329 N.W.2d at 902.
71. Id. at 604-07, 329 N.W.2d at 901.
72. Id. at 601, 329 N.W.2d at 899.
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The court's decision to use the impeachment exception to
admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures has impli-
cations for the practitioner. Because the court phrased its
decision so as to provide a broad interpretation of the im-
peachment exception, the practitioner is left with a general
outline by which the Wisconsin Supreme Court will decide
future cases that present similar issues. In addition, the
court's use of the impeachment exception in Huebner ex-
tends the avenues by which a plaintiff can successfully admit
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a products lia-
bility action.
The Huebner decision has answered the practitioner's
question as to the admissibility of subsequent remedial evi-
dence in a products liability action based upon both negli-
gence and strict liability. However, the court failed to
address what may, in time, become a major concern to the
practitioner: how will this decision impact upon a manufac-
turer who has not made a "remedial" change in the product,
but has made a change for some other purpose? In other
words, how will the court resolve a dispute in which the
manufacturer has altered the product to provide a less costly,
more efficient means of production or to update the product
solely to achieve state-of-the-art status? These questions will
undoubtedly remain unanswered until the right factual case
is posed.
Wisconsin is not the only state to disagree with the fed-
eral courts on the applicability of the exclusionary rule to
strict products liability actions.73 Huebner, as the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated,74 is an extension of Chart v. General
Motors Corp. ,75 which followed the lead established by a
California case, Ault v. International Harvester Co.76 Al-
though California and Wisconsin apply different rules to the
area of strict tort liability in a products liability case," in
Chart, the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to distinguish
the rationale ofAult. The California rule of strict liability in
73. See supra note 3.
74. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d at 607-08, 329 N.W.2d at 902.
75. 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
76. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
77. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1979) in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
1983]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
a products case is a no-fault doctrine.78 In Ault the Califor-
nia Supreme Court said the exclusionary rule was inapplica-
ble because strict liability does not involve the proof of
negligence or culpable conduct.79 In contrast, Wisconsin
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A. 80
Therefore, Wisconsin law provides that establishing the ele-
ments of section 402A compels a finding of negligence per
se.
In summary, state and federal courts differ on the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to products liability actions.
It seems likely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will con-
tinue to favor the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures in products liability actions based upon both negli-
gence and strict liability. The precedent established by
Huebner has provided a viable method by which plaintiffs
can admit evidence of subsequent remedial changes in order
to prove the defendant's liability. However, it will benefit a
defendant to remove the lawsuit to federal court, since, as
discussed above, the majority approach in the federal court
system is to apply the exclusionary rule to both negligence
and strict liability actions.8'
78. Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at __ 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
79. Id. at_, 528 P.2d at 1150-53, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-17.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979) provides:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
81. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, sulra note 6, at 37, in which the author
states:
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, under the Erie doc-
trine the question of admissibility of evidence was generally held to be one of
state law. With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, state law is
generally no longer held applicable to evidentiary issues, unless the federal
rule so specifies.
However, unlike the more "procedural" rules of evidence, Fed. R. Evid.
407 is based primarily upon social policy considerations - nondiscourage-
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B. Legislative Reform
Legislative enactments are another means by which juris-
dictions can determine the applicability of the exclusionary
rule to a strict liability action. Various state legislatures
have enacted statutes that purportedly answer questions
about the use of the exclusionary rule in a products action
based upon strict liability.8 2 However, the Wisconsin Legis-
lature has not followed suit. Consequently, section 904.07 of
the Wisconsin Statutes remains intact.83 One solution would
be to amend section 904.07 to include the manufacture or
sale of a defective product in the definition of negligence.
Other states have chosen this course . 4 Nebraska, for exam-
ple, has adopted the following:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. . . . Negligence or culpable conduct, as used in
this rule, shall include, but not be limited to, the manufac-
ture or sale of a defective product.8 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule is well-recognized, and the excep-
tions to the rule provide an adequate basis for the admission
of subsequent remedial measures if the plaintiff can prove
ment of repairs. Hence, a question exists as to whether Fed. R. Evid. 407 or a
conflicting state evidentiary rule should apply. (footnotes omitted).
82. The following statutes specifically address the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule to a products liability action based upon strict liability: ALASKA R. EvID. 407
(1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.686 (Supp. 1982); HAwAii REv. STAT. § 407
(1981); IDAHO CODE § 6-1306 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.330 (Baldwin
1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 (1979).
83. See supra note 2 for text of Wis. STAT. § 904.07 (1981-82).
84. Several states have followed this course and amended their statutes. For ex-
ample, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (Supp. 1982) provides: "Evidence of any
change made in the design or methods of manufacturing or testing the product or any
similar product subsequent to the time the product was first sold by the defendant is
not admissible as direct evidence of a defect." See also IDAHO CODE § 6-1306 (Supp.
1983) which provides for a blanket exclusion of evidence of changes in a product's
design, warnings or instructions concerning the product as well as technological feasi-
bility for the purpose of proving that the product was defective in design or that a
warning or instruction should have accompanied the product at the time of
manufacture.
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-095 (1982).
1983]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the evidence is being offered for a purpose other than to
prove negligence or other culpable conduct.8 6 In addition,
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 87 and its state
counterparts, provide sufficient protection to defendants in a
products liability action if the probative value of the evi-
dence is determined to be outweighed by the possibility of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misuse by the
jury.
D.L v. Huebner88 has provided plaintiffs with a substan-
tial exception to the exclusionary rule that will, most assur-
edly, act as a precedent and guideline for future similar
products liability actions. Although cogent arguments exist
which support the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to
strict products liability actions, adherence to the rule in
products liability actions alleging both strict liability and
negligence seems to be the better approach. The well-estab-
lished arguments supporting the applicability of the exclu-
sionary rule to strict products liability actions, as well as the
general consensus among those federal courts which have
addressed the issue,89 provide a substantive framework by
which the judicial system can efficiently operate. To accom-
plish this goal in Wisconsin, perhaps the legislature should
follow the lead of Arizona, Idaho and Nebraska, 90 and
amend section 904.07 of the Wisconsin Statutes to include a
provision concerning the admissibility of subsequent meas-
ures in products liability actions based upon strict liability in
tort. Legislative action would, most definitely, clear up
what has become a very murky area of the law in Wisconsin.
TIMOTHY J. YOUNG
86. See supra note 5.
87. See supra note 10 for text of FED. R. EvID. 403.
88. 110 Wis. 2d 581,329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).
89. See supra note 67.
90. See supra notes 84-85.
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